U.S. role key to security, prosperity

President Bush meets with Azerbaijan’s President Heydar Aliyev at the White House.

Squeezed between Russia and Iran on the European side of the Caspian Sea is a moderate Islamic country that calls itself America’s "strategic partner" in the Caucasus. The country has fully backed the United States in the campaign against terrorism with offers of overflight and landing rights. But with a policy hobbled by a special interest group, the United States can’t take advantage of them.

Alone among the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries that were once part of the Soviet empire, this staunchly independent country has rejected Russian requests for military bases, and instead joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace. This year, it became a full member of the Council of Europe.

This moderate, secular Muslim state rejects the Islamic fundamentalism of Iran and Afghanistan, and instead has established cordial relations with Israel. It is a major non-OPEC oil and gas producer exploring reserves believed to rival those of the North Sea in size, and is a key country in transporting the entire Caspian region’s oil and gas to Western markets.

This young nation is marching quickly toward full democracy with the rule of law and a market economy. It has an economy growing at eight percent annually and openly courts American investment in both the oil and non-oil sectors of the economy. It boasts macroeconomic indicators that draw praise from international financial institutions.

It should be expected, then, that the United States would warmly embrace this country and help it in any way it could. Washington, however, finds its policy toward Azerbaijan hobbled by a special interest group in the U.S. Congress. As a result of a policy defended by the Armenian caucus, the United States can’t provide any significant direct government assistance to help this young nation find its way.

In 1992, neighboring Armenia, using combat troops that had been part of the Soviet army, launched a war against Azerbaijan in an attempt to annex Nagorno-Karabagh, a scenic and agriculturally rich mountainous region of Azerbaijan with an Armenian majority population.

Armenia’s attempt to grab Azerbaijani lands resulted in the loss of about 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s territory, including Nagorno-Karabagh. Armenian ethnic cleansing, as Azerbaijanis refer to it, of that region and the seven surrounding provinces it seized, created nearly one million refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). That number represents more than one-eighth of Azerbaijan’s population and is the largest number of IDPs in any nation on earth.

In 1992, the well-financed Armenian lobby in the Congress succeeded in inserting Section 907 into the Freedom Support Act. That provision prohibits direct U.S. Government assistance to the government of Azerbaijan, and in effect labels Azerbaijan the aggressor.

"Solving that conflict is Azerbaijan’s number one foreign policy priority, " Quliyev says. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) created a negotiating mechanism for the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict in 1992, known as the Minsk group. After President Aliyev came to power in 1993, Azerbaijan and the Minsk group achieved a cease-fire in 1994. Since then, despite more than 20 meetings between the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia, negotiations have not produced a solution.

In April, Secretary of State Colin Powell launched the Key West Peace Talks where significant progress was made, followed by a Washington meeting with President Bush. "But no document was completely agreed in Key West," Quliyev says. " Perhaps 80 percent of the Key West document was acceptable. Right now, there is no acceptable proposal on the table."

There is, however, a growing chorus of leading public figures in America such as Senator Sam Brownback who are actively recommending that 907 be stricken from the books. Both the Bush and Clinton administrations opposed section 907 because it constricts American policy in a volatile region.

Problems with the U.S., however, have not detoured Azerbaijan from its chosen path." In 1991, when Azerbaijan became independent again, we reaffirmed that path we chose when we were briefly independent at the time of the Bolshevik revolution - we were dedicated to democracy, human rights and universal values," Quliyev says.

"There are three main directions to our foreign policy," Quliyev explains. "First, we want to integrate Azerbaijan with those countries espousing Western European values. Second, we want to reaffirm our natural, Eastern direction and heritage. Third, we want to be good neighbors in our region and with the CIS states."

Azerbaijan’s neighbors have not always welcomed the strategic choices that Azerbaijan pursues in its foreign policy, Quliyev notes. "We are trying to build a secular, civil state based on the rule of law. We want cooperation with the United States, Israel and the Western countries."

"But," he continues, "there is a religious regime in power in Iran. That regime has declared the United States and Israel as enemies of all Islamic states. So Iran does not like our choices of dealing with the United States and Israel."

The menace that Iran poses was dramatically demonstrated in July, when Iranian fighters overflew Azerbaijani cities dozens of times, and an Iranian warship threatened a British Petroleum research vessel, causing the research vessel to withdraw.

The territorial boundaries in the waters of the Caspian Sea have not been determined and agreed among the five nations bordering it. During the Soviet period, Iran’s portion of the Caspian was determined by drawing a line across the Caspian, from its border with Azerbaijan to the border with Turkmenistan, giving Iran about 14 percent of the Caspian.

Iran argues that since five states border the Caspian, each state should get 20 percent of the Caspian’s waters. According to Western oil executives who follow Iranian oil events closely, the extra six percent that Iran claims comes mainly out of Azerbaijan’s oil-rich share.

The Iranians have provided military and other assistance to Armenia, despite the obvious religious differences between fundamental Islamic Iran and Christian Armenia. What explains the bellicose Iranian behavior?

Regional experts point out that there is nothing that Iran could fear more than a democratic, prosperous, Western leaning, secular Islamic state to its north, composed of the same people as perhaps a half of its own population.

When the Russian and Persian war in the early 1800s was settled, the Azeri nation was split. The northern part of Azerbaijan retained the name with a population of about eight million in modern times. But the larger part of the Azeri nation, variously estimated now at between 24 and 32 million people, became part of Iran.

"So, on our south side, we have tensions with Iran, and we take those tensions very seriously," Quliyev says. "We choose the way of negotiations - we can’t envision an armed conflict with Iran."

Help from Turkey, including a visit by the Chief of Defense Staff and a demonstration by the Turkish Air Force aerial demonstration team in August, plus a strong statement by us Assistant Secretary for Europe and Eurasian Affairs Elizabeth Jones apparently helped dissuade Iran from further provocations for the time being.

The Iranian belligerency, however, accomplished its objective. According to senior company executives in Baku, neither British Petroleum nor any other oil company will agree to undertake further exploration in the contested areas until the five nations agree on a permanent territorial boundary scheme. No early settlement of the issue is foreseen.

Sometimes troubled relations with Russia since Azerbaijan’s independence have proved more amenable to resolution. "It is natural, after our long history together, that Russia wants to keep Azerbaijan and all the other CIS states in its ‘zone of influence,’" Quliyev explains. Besides supporting Armenia, Quliyev says, Russia was also unhappy that Azerbaijan declined a military alliance and instead chose to side with NATO.

"But there is a difference between Yeltzin’s Russia and Putin’s Russia," the minister says. "After Putin visited Baku in January 2000, there were some positive changes. Putin emphasized the importance of Azerbaijan to Russia and improved the basis for future bilateral relations."

As a result of Putin’s visit, the activities of Chechnyan partisans, who had used Azerbaijan as a rear base, were restricted. Several Chechnyan leaders were arrested and extradited to Russia. In return, Russia is believed to have eased some bureaucratic harassment, such as repeated customs inspections of Azerbaijani produce being trucked to Moscow, which led to delays and ruined cargos. Russia, however, can still exercise important economic pressure when it feels like it.

Relations with Georgia flow from a common need to work together. "Our strategy is to work closely with Georgia - we must work together to solve difficulties," Quliyev says.

Azerbaijan has been occasionally frustrated in its dealings with the United States. The pull of the American model is evident in nearly every Azerbaijani, from the president to the refugee barely surviving in his tent camp. However, Quliyev says diplomatically, "We don’t want to lose our roots in the East, but we want to adopt Western values. We are at the beginning of the road. I would like to see the United States truly assist the role of Azerbaijan in the region."