Angola

An interview with Herman Cohen

Former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger describes Herman Cohen as having "a profound understanding of Africa, with all its variety, promise, and problems." Cohen, who has long been at the forefront in shaping the bilateral relations between the United States and Angola, has served as the Senior Director for Africa on the staff of the National Security Council under Ronald Reagan, and as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs during the Bush Administration.

Herman Cohen

Cohen first traveled to Angola in April of 1987 and, over the next several years, returned often in order to work on a variety of issues affecting the southern Africa region.
In this interview Cohen outlines the current state of US-Angolan relations and reflects on the chain of events that lead to a complete turnabout in US support from rebel leader Jonas Savimbi to the Government of Angola.
Rosenberg: Having served under a Republican administration how did you, in the 1990s, come to represent the Government of Angola which is lead by a political party that was, at one time, avowedly Marxist?
Cohen: During the Reagan and Bush administrations we, as a Cold War thing, supported Savimbi’s UNITA organization. Later, however, we brokered a peace agreement between UNITA and the government in 1991.
In effect, as supporters of UNITA, working as peace mediators, we achieved everything that Savimbi had asked for. He wanted a free and fair election (in 1992) because he was sure that he was going to be elected.
Savimbi had come to represent the masses while the government tended to represent the elite- people with Portuguese ancestry. So Savimbi had a point, he said, ‘I can’t win the war. You guys (the Americans) have kept me from being defeated.’ We got him the election that he wanted, but he bungled the election campaign- took advice from the wrong people and started touting his war-fighting capabilities.
He also promoted revenge- went around talking about blowing up bridges and that sort of thing. He walked around the country with large numbers of Army people. He talked about getting revenge on black marketeers- scaring people to death.

Courtesy UN Cartographic Section

So people said- well we have a choice between a government which steals and Savimbi who kills. The lesser of the evils is the government. So he lost the election, although he did get quite a few seats in parliament- about forty percent of the vote- so it showed he had a big base in the country. He had promised us before the vote that he would follow the results of the election come-what-may.
But of course he didn’t. He had kept his forces hidden, had his arms buried, and when he lost the election he went back to war.
So at that point our obligation to him was over. We had brokered his election. He didn’t play fair. We felt free to have good relations with the government.
Of course, even before the election, the Bush Administration had more or less normalized relations with the government- without actually having diplomatic relations. They eventually opened an office here in Washington.
Actually we ended up having better relations with the government than the Clinton Administration did! The Democrats, who were always criticizing us for supporting this puppet of South Africa (UNITA), ended up having terrible relations with the government.
Rosenberg: Does Savimbi still have support in Washington?
Cohen: He still has friends- Senator Helms and a few others.
I would say, Congressman Royce (R-CA, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa), for example, who is a very strong conservative, has always been friendly to UNITA through out the years, has now completely turned against them. So I think Helms is just about the only one left.
Congressman Gilman (former Chairman of the House International Relations Committee), received Angolan government a couple of years back and said to them, "We’ve supported Savimbi in the past, but he has betrayed us and is no longer our friend."
Rosenberg: Do you think the US should insist on further negotiations between the Angolan government and Jonas Savimbi?
Cohen: I think the Clinton Administration made a big mistake pushing for the second agreement (Lusaka 1994), upon which Savimbi later reneged. My feeling is, "Fool me once- shame on you. Fool me twice- shame on me." They saw what he did with the first agreement (1991) leading to the elections, why should he go through with the second?
The second agreement was even worse for Savimbi. It was humiliating. Only he was to disarm. The government was not supposed to disarm. So why should he go through with it?
The 1994 agreement effectively saved UNITA from a military defeat. There are two ways of looking at peace agreements: One is to make peace the other one is to keep making war in another form. For UNITA it's making war in another form.
So what is the government to do? It would be silly, from my point of view, to say okay let's have talks and give UNITA another chance to revitalize itself when, in effect, they are in the process of marginalizing UNITA militarily.
I think the government is justified in not engaging in peace talks now. One can only assume that UNITA would use it to get more breathing space.
Rosenberg: How would you describe the Angolan government’s relationship with the United States today?
Cohen: I would say it had been tepid, but is now beginning to warm up.
The Angolan government has said, "You have lead us into two agreements, and each agreement Savimbi has reneged, and he becomes stronger after each one!
So don’t tell us now to have a third agreement. We feel the solution is military now. And what has the US done? The US has broken all military to military relations."
This is the most powerful army in that sub-region… and we have no relations with that army!
This was a part of the United Nations sanctions that we are implementing. But what should we really have been doing if we thought we needed to get the bad guys? We should have been giving the government intelligence that would tell them where UNITA was getting all these supplies. Instead we didn’t give them anything.
Rosenberg: What was the holdup?
Cohen: Because the Angolan army went into neighboring Congo-Brazzaville in 1997 and the US government frowned on that because they thought it was in support of a coup. I think that was a bad diagnosis. I think they went in there to protect their interest but their intervention ended a civil war. So it ended up saving a lot of people's lives.
Rosenberg: What progress is being made in arranging an MPRI (Military Professional Resource Inc.) program for the Angolan military?
Cohen: The MPRI program has never gotten off the ground. It's been a proposal for six years now. And the idea is that after the civil war the Angolan army needs restructuring of the organization to make it an army that can operate in a democratic system. They will need to become better administrators and instill more professionalism.
But the funding [for the program] can only come from the Angolan government itself. They have been looking at it for all these years and saying they like it but they never seem to be able to come up with the funding, which is not surprising since virtually all of their money goes to buying arms in order to pursue the war against UNITA. So, MPRI is a good idea but it is not going anywhere for the moment because of lack of funding.
Rosenberg: Has the US ever helped the Angolan government with intelligence regarding UNITA’s arms procurement process?
Cohen: I left government at the end of 1993 so I don't know what has happened since then.
I remember talking to a high official in the State Department in early 1999 and I asked if it wouldn't be good for the US to give to the government information about where [UNITA] air fields are and which planes are flying in and that sort of thing. But I was told that US intelligence gathering does not focus on that because there are higher priorities elsewhere.
But this was as of early 1999. I don't know, it may have changed since then. Because the intelligence community must be given orders to focuson things. UNITA sanctions- busting is not on the priority list. Also I think the South Africans, who tend to favor UNITA, are turning a blind eye to flights coming off their territory in my opinion. We know a lot of flights come in from South Africa and the South African government is just not doing anything about it.
Rosenberg: What do you make of the various top-level defections that Savimbi has experienced?
Cohen: Well it indicates to me that Savimbi's support base is eroding and that he himself does not allow any internal discussions within his ranks. So if anyone expresses any misgivings about a policy, or says maybe we should implement the agreements that we have already signed they’re generally in danger so they have to run away.
Plus the fact that the government, maybe, is pretty generous with people who defect.
Rosenberg: It’s an impossible question, given that the war is now into its twenty sixth year, but do you feel that we are anywhere near seeing a conclusion to this conflict?
Cohen: Well I think there will be, before long, a conclusion in the sense that UNITA will peter out. It's not the type of thing that will end with a peace treaty or anything – it will just fizzle out. It will continue on in pockets- which I think is about the best thing [the government] can do at this point. Drive them into corners.
And also the government is trying to cut off the border areas along Namibia and Zambia. So they will slowly squeeze UNITA and at some point they will just fizzle out I think.
Rosenberg: Talk about the Bilateral Consultative Commission that was set up between the United States and Angola. Why was it needed in the first place? Where does it presently stand?
Cohen: The Bilateral Consultative Commission is a device that is used by the US government to demonstrate that they want to have major improvements in their relationship with particular countries. This is what was done with South Africa.
In effect it says to the other nation- you are a privileged partner for us.
It means they have major meetings every twice a year at high levels and I guess it was a reaction to the fact that we were very cold to Angola for about a couple of years because of their involvement in Congo Brazzaville.
The question remains, however- what is our policy toward Angola and what is their policy toward us? It helps us in the business relationship field, we have a lot of oil investments there, so these twice- annual meetings allow the business community to get involved. But I don't think [these meetings] are particularly significant in terms of what has to be accomplished.
Rosenberg: Talk about the economic changes underway in Angola- issues of transparency and privatization.
Cohen: Well the Angolans had been unable to develop a relationship with the IMF and the World Bank for a number of years because of their unwillingness to have transparency in their accounts. Ninety percent of their budget comes from oil and they have been unwilling to open their books.
They've said it was a national security issue because so much of their money was being spent on arms and they didn't want to show the world where they were spending their money, how much and all that. So the IMF and the World Bank have said look- we are willing to work with you but we can't be lending you money of the taxpayers of the international community unless we know where you're own money is being spent.
Up until recently there's been a stand off. Recently they appointed new officials who have made a lot of progress in developing a transparent budgetary processes. The IMF is in the lead on this and they've been going through, what they call, a staff monitoring program with Angola- which means- well if you do the right things for a year then we'll come in and provide help.
They're in that process now. So that's a good sign. But whether they will actually be able to implement all of the reforms necessary that's not easy to say. They've never been able to do it in the past.
Privatization is still a long way off and whatever has been privatized, so far, has been a lot like the Soviet Union where privatization has benefited party officials rather than being done on an economic basis. So they have a long way to go, but the latest news from the IMF is that they seem to be making progress.
Rosenberg: Is there the political will, in Angola, to stick to these goals?
Cohen: It seems that they do have the political will, but with oil prices so high they will probably say at some point- well we don't need the IMF, we're making so much money. So far most of the money has all been spent on arms and drained off on corrupt practices.
Rosenberg: When peace comes to Angola how big of a regional player do you think it will it be?
Cohen: Well it certainly has already played a major role in the security of the region by a sending troops to the two Congo’s. It has become a stabilizing force. It has effectively stopped the war in Congo-Brazzaville.
You can agree or disagree that they supported one faction there. But it certainly stopped the war and helped avoid a lot more destruction.
And they forced a process where by an effort is being made to get all foreign forces out of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (former Zaire) so that the Congolese people can decide their own future. At least they've been a stabilizing force in the region, and I think they can continue to play that role with their military.
As an engine of growth- I do not see it except if they stop spending money on arms and start rebuilding their own infrastructure. They could become big importers of things from South Africa and Zimbabwe- countries that are already producing goods for export, and therefore stimulate economic growth in the sub-region.
But the whole thing depends on them using their own money constructively. So far this has not happened.